Five Ransomware Attacks That Nearly Broke Big Companies — What Happened Behind the Scenes

I. Introduction: Ransomware as a Business Crisis

The definition of a catastrophic business risk has fundamentally changed. Ransomware, once relegated to the specialized concerns of the IT department, is now a systemic threat to organizational solvency, supply chain continuity, and market valuation. Recent attacks targeting global giants underscore a crucial reality for corporate leadership: these incidents are not failures of technology alone, but critical failures of executive governance and strategic oversight.

A. The New Corporate Risk: Solvency and Supply Chain

Modern ransomware is a form of malicious software designed to encrypt digital files, rendering systems and the mission-critical data they rely on unusable. Malicious actors typically demand payment in untraceable digital currencies, such as Bitcoin, in exchange for the decryption key, making the tracing and prosecution of perpetrators exceedingly difficult. The global volume of attacks, which included an estimated 493 million incidents in 2022, proves that this threat is pervasive and highly profitable, with global ransom payments reaching a record $1.25 billion in 2023.

The greatest evolution in the threat landscape is the dominance of Double Extortion. This tactic moves beyond simple system encryption. Malicious actors now frequently exfiltrate (steal) the victim's sensitive data before deploying the encryption malware. The ransom demand then carries two forms of leverage: the immediate pressure of operational paralysis, and the long-term threat of reputational damage, regulatory fines (such as GDPR), and loss of consumer trust if the stolen data is published online. This dual threat escalates a cyber incident from an operational disruption to a full-scale corporate crisis, requiring leadership to master both technical recovery and data protection.

B. The Executive Mandate: Making Cyber Resilience a Board-Level Responsibility

The resulting economic and reputational consequences of ransomware and data extortion have proven challenging and costly for organizations of all sizes, often extending far beyond the initial disruption through long recovery periods. Given this scale of impact, cybersecurity governance cannot be delegated far down the organizational chart.

Ransomware is unequivocally a board-level responsibility. Business leaders must recognize that their mindset must shift from questioning "if" an incident will occur, to focusing on "when" they will experience a cyber incident. Understanding the gravity of this threat allows executive teams to hold constructive discussions with their technical experts, focusing specifically on preparedness and ensuring comprehensive incident management plans are developed and regularly tested against the unique challenges posed by modern extortion tactics.

II. Part I: The Immediate Threat — Lessons from the 2025 Attacks

The series of high-profile attacks that occurred in 2025 across Western Europe demonstrated that modern digital interconnectedness turns localized security failures into cascading ecosystem disasters, impacting critical sectors from automotive manufacturing to global aviation [4].

Case Study 1: Jaguar Land Rover (2025) – The Cost of Fragile Logistics

The Operational Shock

In September 2025, Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) Automotive PLC suffered a severe cybersecurity breach. The attack was so debilitating that it necessitated a month-long shutdown of production at JLR plants throughout the UK, paralyzing the company’s ability to conduct global business operations. The hacking group, identified as 'Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters,' announced the attack on a high-profile public channel.

Behind the Scenes: The JIT Trap

The incident provided a stark illustration of the acute vulnerability inherent in highly efficient logistics models. JLR’s reliance on a "just-in-time" (JIT) logistics model, while maximizing efficiency and minimizing inventory costs, fundamentally relies on real-time data feeds and interconnected systems. When the digital nervous system of the company was compromised and its systems became inaccessible, the entire physical operation became a single point of catastrophic failure.

The strategic choice to pursue maximum efficiency through JIT translates directly into a massive, sustained cyber risk. Corporate operations and procurement departments must now rigorously quantify the potential cost of catastrophic downtime—such as the month-long shutdown experienced by JLR—and weigh that cost against the savings generated by the JIT model. This incident confirms that supply chain optimization is now inextricably linked to digital resilience.

The Uninsured Financial Blow

The financial fallout from the JLR attack is expected to stretch well into the hundreds of millions of pounds. This massive financial exposure was compounded by a crucial lapse in strategic financial preparation: JLR was forced to "bear the totality of its losses".

This outcome stands in sharp contrast to companies like Marks & Spencer (M&S), which, as discussed below, had appropriate cyber coverage in place that was estimated to reduce the impact of its losses by up to 100$ million. The decision by JLR’s leadership to forgo adequate cyber insurance in an era of multi-million-pound incidents resulted in a strategic liability that threatened the company’s financial stability.

Case Study 2: Marks & Spencer (2025) – Protecting the Customer Interface

The Service Disruption

In late April 2025, Marks & Spencer Group PLC (M&S) and other major UK retailers faced significant cyber incidents. The attack on M&S involved sophisticated techniques, including social engineering, used by the hackers to infiltrate systems before deploying ransomware.

The impact was immediate and customer-facing. M&S had to suspend its online sales for five days, leading to significant disruption across its operations. Critical digital services, including contactless payments, gift card services, and click-and-collect, were crippled, and food item availability was disrupted in certain stores.

Behind the Scenes: Digital Reliance and Reputational Collapse

While the immediate revenue loss during the five-day outage was estimated at 3.8$ million per day in online sales, the long-term damage was reflected in the market's reaction. The company's stock market value dropped by over 500$ million. This substantial market devaluation demonstrates that investors penalize the loss of consumer trust and the perception of unmanaged corporate risk far more harshly than immediate revenue leakage.

The use of social engineering as an initial access vector means that the failure was rooted in human behavior, training, and privileged access management. This necessitates that executive teams mandate and enforce rigorous, continual staff training focused on phishing and credential hygiene. Minimizing long-term market volatility requires not only rapid service restoration but also immediate, proactive, and transparent communication with customers, investors, and regulators to manage the inevitable reputational strain.

Case Study 3: Collins Aerospace (RTX, 2025) – The Third-Party Catastrophe

The Global Impact

In September 2025, a sophisticated ransomware attack was confirmed against the airline passenger processing software provided by Collins Aerospace, a subsidiary of RTX Corp. Attributed to the HardBit ransomware group, the incident paralyzed automated services across several major European airports, including London’s Heathrow, Brussels Airport, and facilities in Berlin and Dublin.

Behind the Scenes: Vendor Dependency

The critical target was the Multi-User System Environment (MUSE) software, a vital platform used by airlines to share check-in desks, process passengers, and track baggage. The incident was characterized as a third-party outage associated with a ransomware event at the vendor. This cascading failure forced airports to revert to manual processing and led to widespread flight delays, long queues, and isolated cancellations.

The unique aspect of this case lies in the financial distinction. Despite the massive operational disruption caused to the global aviation ecosystem, the parent company, RTX, stated in an SEC filing that the attack was not expected to have a material impact on its financial results.

This creates a critical governance paradox: the operational liability associated with critical third-party software vendors is often externalized. The core lesson for corporate clients is that while the vendor may escape severe financial harm, the client's operational continuity—and reputation—is entirely dependent on the weakest link in their supply chain. This requires C-suites to rigorously audit and monitor all vendors whose software influences mission-critical operational technology (OT) or industrial control systems (ICS), particularly those used for physical processes like passenger processing and manufacturing support.

III. Part II: Historical Precedents — Failures of Foundation and Decision

While the 2025 incidents demonstrate the modern threat, two foundational cases highlight that catastrophic failure often results from neglecting the most basic security controls.

Case Study 4: Colonial Pipeline (2021) – The High Price of Low Security

The National Crisis

In May 2021, the Colonial Pipeline, the largest fuel pipeline in the US, supplying 45% of the fuel to the East Coast, suffered a devastating ransomware attack by the DarkSide group. The company halted all pipeline operations to contain the attack, causing widespread fuel shortages and national panic.

Behind the Scenes: The Trivial Root Cause

The root cause of this national crisis was a shockingly simple failure: the attackers gained initial access through a single, compromised password for a virtual private network (VPN) account. The systemic vulnerability that enabled this breach was the lack of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) on this critical VPN account.

This incident provides a stark lesson for executive teams: sophisticated security expenditures are neutralized if foundational, low-cost controls like MFA are not universally enforced, particularly on all privileged and remote access points. The failure was not in detecting a zero-day exploit, but in neglecting the most essential security hygiene.

The Ransom Calculus

Colonial Pipeline’s leadership faced immense pressure. The company ultimately paid the 4.4$ million ransom in Bitcoin. The CEO stated that the controversial decision was made because it was "the right thing to do for the country". This incident demonstrates that for critical infrastructure, the decision to pay transcends standard financial calculations and must account for national security and public safety. Leadership teams must pre-determine and document their ransomware response policies, including their stance on ransom payment, long before an attack occurs. Fortunately, the Department of Justice announced the recovery of  million worth of the Bitcoin payment weeks later.

Case Study 5: Travelex (2019) – The Ultimate Cost of Unpatched Vulnerabilities

The Business Failure

In December 2019, the UK foreign currency agency Travelex, which services dozens of high street banks, was targeted by the Sodinokibi (REvil) ransomware group. The attack paralyzed the company’s global services, forcing employees in branches to revert to processing transactions using "pen and paper". The subsequent disruption, coupled with other market factors, ultimately contributed to Travelex entering administration (insolvency) in August 2020. The attackers demanded 6 million, and Travelex eventually paid 2.3 million to decrypt the stolen data.

Behind the Scenes: The Governance Lethargy

The systemic fault that led to Travelex’s demise was not a failure of detection, but a failure of process. The attackers exploited a known vulnerability in the company's VPN servers. The catastrophic failure was that the vulnerability's software vendor (Pulse Secure) had already identified the flaw and released a necessary patch over eight months prior to the attack.

Travelex's failure to apply a readily available fix for a widely known vulnerability meant the company left itself unnecessarily exposed. This case stands as a definitive example of governance lethargy leading directly to business death. Leaders must recognize that timely patch management is not a routine maintenance task for IT staff; it is a critical, audited, life-or-death operational procedure that must be governed by strict policies and accountability structures. The human element—allowing details to "slip through the cracks" in a large organization—was the core fault.

IV. Strategic Synthesis: Five Pillars of Corporate Resilience

The analysis of the five critical incidents—JLR, M&S, Collins Aerospace, Colonial Pipeline, and Travelex—reveals that disparate technical failures trace back to a consistent pattern of strategic and governance weaknesses. To aid non-technical corporate leadership, the following table summarizes the key failures and their outcomes:

Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Five Major Ransomware Attacks

Company (Year)	Core Business Impact	Primary Strategic Failure (Behind the Scenes)	Initial Access Vector/Type	Financial/Reputational Consequence
Jaguar Land Rover (2025)	Month-long Global Production Shutdown	Reliance on fragile, just-in-time logistics model & Lack of Cyber Insurance	Undisclosed (Ransomware)	Hundreds of Millions in Uninsured Losses
Marks & Spencer (2025)	Online Sales Halted (5 days), Service Disruption	Inadequate protection against sophisticated social engineering	Social Engineering / Ransomware	500$M+ Market Value Drop; 3.8$M/day sales loss
Collins Aerospace (2025)	Widespread Airport Operational Chaos & Flight Delays	Unmanaged Risk in Critical Third-Party Software (MUSE)	Third-Party Vulnerability (HardBit Ransomware)	Non-material financial impact to parent RTX; Massive impact to aviation ecosystem
Colonial Pipeline (2021)	Critical U.S. Fuel Infrastructure Shutdown	Systemic failure to implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)	Compromised VPN Password / DarkSide Ransomware	4.4$M Ransom Paid; National Crisis
Travelex (2019)	Complete Operational Paralysis, Ultimate Insolvency	Failure to apply known software patch for over eight months	Internet-Facing Vulnerability (Pulse Secure) / Sodinokibi Ransomware	2.3$M Ransom Paid; Business Failure

Based on these incidents, five pillars of corporate resilience must guide executive action:

A. Pillar 1: Governance Over Technology

The scale of losses suffered by JLR and M&S, and the ensuing national crisis following the Colonial Pipeline attack, confirm that the core failure is not rooted in technological complexity, but in governance simplicity. Cyber risk requires proactive board oversight.

The lesson here is to shift focus from reactive firefighting to proactive mandate setting. Leadership must ensure that the organization's risk register clearly reflects the probability and impact of ransomware, treating it as an existential threat on par with major regulatory or economic shocks.

B. Pillar 2: The Supply Chain Shield (Third-Party Risk Management)

The Collins Aerospace incident clearly demonstrated that robust internal security is insufficient if critical third-party vendors are compromised. The operational paralysis of the aviation industry resulted from a vendor's failure, underscoring that third-party risk is an externalization of core business risk. Similarly, JLR’s JIT supply chain fragility turned a data breach into a physical shutdown.

Leaders must implement continuous, stringent due diligence and monitoring for all critical vendors. Contracts must include explicit security posture requirements, the right to audit, and mandated rapid incident notification procedures. Particular attention must be paid to vendors that control critical operational technology (OT) or influence complex physical logistics.

C. Pillar 3: Mastering the Foundational Basics

The catastrophic failures of Colonial Pipeline and Travelex resulted from attackers exploiting the weakest, most obvious flaws, categorized by security experts as "Initial Access Vectors" [1].

Travelex collapsed because it failed to patch a vulnerability for over eight months. Colonial Pipeline was breached through a single password because Multi-Factor Authentication was missing. These incidents prove that investment in advanced security tools is wasted if foundational controls are not universally enforced. Executive teams must immediately mandate and audit the implementation of MFA for all privileged and remote access points and enforce a zero-tolerance policy for missing critical security patches on internet-facing assets.

D. Pillar 4: The Financial Imperative (Insurance and Recovery)

Cyber risk quantification must be treated as a strategic financial planning exercise. The contrasting outcomes of JLR, which bore the totality of its hundreds of millions in losses, versus M&S, which had coverage in place to mitigate a substantial portion of its financial impact, is the most actionable lesson for the CFO.

Annual review and stress testing of cyber insurance coverage is mandatory. Policies must be assessed not just for incident response costs and potential regulatory fines, but specifically for coverage limits related to worst-case business interruption, accounting for multi-week or month-long shutdowns, as experienced by JLR.

E. Pillar 5: Crisis Command and Control

Ransomware attacks are complex organizational disasters that merge technical restoration, law enforcement involvement, regulatory compliance (especially data breach notification requirements), and public relations management.

Organizations must develop and routinely practice incident management plans that are specifically tailored for ransomware. This must include clear communication strategies for customers, investors, and regulatory bodies like the ICO. Recovery from these complex attacks is often extended and costly, even after paying the ransom; for instance, the restoration tool provided to Colonial Pipeline required a "very long processing time". Crisis response plans must prioritize rapid service restoration while simultaneously managing the data publication threat inherent in double extortion attacks.

The following checklist translates these observed failures into immediate governance actions:

C-Suite Cybersecurity Governance Action Checklist

Governance Area	Executive Mandate (Must-Do)	Operational Checkpoint (KPI Focus)	Case Study Reference
Identity Protection	Mandate Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for 100% of all critical and remote access points (VPNs, Cloud, Admin).	Percentage of critical users/systems protected by MFA.	Colonial Pipeline
Vulnerability Management	Establish a zero-tolerance policy for missing critical security patches on internet-facing systems.	Average time-to-patch for high and critical vulnerabilities.	Travelex
Supply Chain Risk	Require contractual cyber resilience guarantees and auditing rights for vendors supporting critical operations (OT/JIT).	Ratio of vendor audits conducted vs. critical operational vendors identified.	JLR & Collins Aerospace
Financial Risk Transfer	Conduct annual stress tests of cyber insurance coverage limits against worst-case business interruption loss scenarios.	Coverage limit vs. estimated worst-case financial impact (e.g., JLR losses).	JLR vs. M&S
Crisis Planning	Develop and rehearse specific "Double Extortion" response plans that address data leakage threats alongside system restoration.	Time to service restoration post-incident; communication speed metric.	M&S & General Threat

V. Conclusion: Moving Beyond Mitigation to Resilience

The 2025 incidents involving Jaguar Land Rover, Marks & Spencer, and Collins Aerospace serve as irrefutable evidence that ransomware is now the definitive metric of a modern corporation’s viability. These attacks were not merely technical exploits; they exposed fundamental governance shortcomings in supply chain management, financial planning, and the enforcement of basic cyber hygiene.

For corporate leadership, the strategic shift requires moving investment away from simply purchasing new defensive technologies, and toward instilling robust governance and accountability. Resilience is achieved when the executive team treats cyber defense as a continuous, mandated operational function. By prioritizing non-negotiable foundational controls (MFA and patching), rigorously vetting third-party risk, and ensuring adequate financial risk transfer through insurance, organizations can develop the resilience needed not only to survive a major attack but to minimize disruption and recover rapidly.